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Abstract
Fuelled by the skyrocketing commodities prices and the booming
middle-classes in emerging economies, the Islamic equity funds indus-
try has been in the recent years one of the fastest growing sector in
the global finance panorama.
This paper discusses the peculiar characteristics of an Italian equity
portfolio constructed following the Sharia’a provisions and the oppor-
tunities this industry offers to Italian financial institutions in both the
retail and wholesale markets.
This paper also discusses how these funds weathered the financial cri-
sis and how they are able to offer a value-added to particular investor
classes along with the ethical part.
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1 Introduction
During the past years, partially thanks to the rise of the oil price and the
strong growth of many emerging economies, one of the rising stars in the
world of finance has been Islamic finance. From the skyscrapers of Dubai
and Kuala Lampur, to the XIX century palaces of Paris, there has been a
growing interest in this business.
In this framework a particular sector showed an impressive growth: the Is-
lamic equity funds industry.
Fuelled by the appetite of the HNWIs in the Gulf and of the booming middle-
class of Islamic countries as Malaysia and Indonesia, the AUM rose three
times to US$ 20 billion in 2008 (Failaka Advisors). However, as the en-
tire Investment Management industry, the Islamic equity funds industry has
been seriously hit by the financial crisis, a crisis that did not spare the GCC
and South-East Asia. The most relevant consequence has been a large out-
flow from equity investments particularly among the mass-aﬄuent (portfolio
weight of equities from 80% to 40%) and HNWIs (from 60% to 20%) (2009,
E&Y IFIR).
It is important to underline that this outflow is probably only temporary:
the recipient of the outflow has been the money market (usually considered
a safe harbour during bad weather) and, as the movements in early 2009
demonstrated, these investors are slowly returning to equities.
Although the heavy toll, the crisis has also brought benefits to a fossilizing
industry.
The crisis has pushed ahead the transformation from an Islamic-countries-
focused investing strategy to a more broad country breakdown panorama:
in 2004 the weight of MEA+Asia was 51%, in 2008 only 25% (2009, E&Y
IFIR).
Besides, the crisis pushed the Islamic equity funds player to seek new market
opportunities, particularly in countries like Turkey, Iran and Pakistan that
have been barely interested by the Islamic finance boom (2009, E&Y IFIR):
in fact the heavy concentration on few oil and export dependent economies
(GCC, Malaysia, etc..) is one of the causes of the sharp industry growth
slowdown.
Last but not least, the crisis taught the industry that the excessive concen-
trations on HNWIs and on mass-aﬄuent is dangerous: although, particularly
the latter, have an high propensity to invest in Islamic products, they are
very susceptible to market conditions and quickly shift from a low-performing
asset to the safer money-market (2009, E&Y IFIR). As the shift from a uber-
class-centric industry to a mass-aﬄuent-focused one has been one of the ma-
jor reasons behind the impressive growth, the entrance in the institutional
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market has become a must for the stability and development of the industry.
SWFs, endowments and particularly pension funds are becoming more and
more widespread and interested in compliant products: all investors that
usually guarantee stabler money flows. Especially pension funds (strongly
correlated with the rise of the emerging economies and the growth of the
middle-class) should be the major target of the Islamic equity fund industry:
it is actually the only type of investor that increased the weight of equities
in its portfolio (2009, E&Y IFIR).
The crisis clearly offered to the Islamic funds industry an opportunity to
grow, but it also offered a test bed to actually test the profit potential. In
the past many tried to understand the behaviour of this kind of funds, usually
obtaining heterogeneous results. However they identified a series of common
elements: lower risk, higher costs and a widespread diversification problem.
This paper would like to be a brief insight into this not largely explored terri-
tory, an insight written using two particularly eyes: the eye of a (post)-crisis
analysts and the eye of an Italian one.
This paper would like to understand how these funds weathered one of the
worst financial crisis of the last sixty years, to understand if they are able to
offer a value-added to investors along with the ethical part.
This paper would like to analyse what opportunities this industry offers to
the Italian financial institutions and to the Italian equity market, to under-
stand how can Italian institutions leverage their position and if the Italian
market is compatible with this industry.
In the first three chapters it has been focussed on the characteristics under-
lying the Islamic equity funds industry: what are the Islamic guidelines and
how they are applied to the stock selection process and fund management.
Based on these provisions, it has been constructed a portfolio of Italian equi-
ties based on the MIBTEL. While in the appendix, it has been conducted a
brief comparison between Islamic and traditional funds and ETFs focussing
on the period interested by the financial crisis.
The facts and non-facts, the problems and the doubts that interest this in-
dustry are much more numerous than these and, as the reader will find out,
there are a lot of question that will be left unanswered.
This paper would not be a summa theologiae of the Islamic equity funds
world (this would require some volumes), but the answer to the most press-
ing questions in the Bel Paese
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2 Islamic Finance Principles
Before entering in the details regarding the function of Islamic equity funds,
it is extremely important to understand what are the religious and Islamic
law principles that lie behind the whole Islamic finance concept.
While there are several texts written by eminent Islamic scholars about this
subject, the Qur’an and the Sunna are still the source of the majority of
the guidelines governing the management of an Islamic equity fund and, in
general, of Islamic finance.
The Qur’an and the Sunna are primarily holy books, but, thanks to their
“realism”, they are also a guide for many believers about how to behave in
the social and economical life. Besides, the Sharia’a itself sets a series of
principles about trade and investment.
The four pillars are: the prohibition of Riba, the prohibition of Gharar, the
prohibition of Maisir and the prohibition to be involved in haram businesses.
2.1 Riba
The western banking system is practically based on interests: in exchange for
the money you deposit or you borrow, you will receive or you will have to pay
a particular sum that can be considered a remuneration of your commitment
or a burden of the service offered to you.
The idea that interests are morally not acceptable is rooted in many religions,
in the past also Christians used to condemn this as a form of “usury” (the
financing job has been originally run by Jews).
The underlying theory is that money generated from other money is actually
unproductive and, besides, it generates social and economical inequalities.
People who have money should help people who need it, not exploit them
charging a greater burden.
While the western world has (nearly) totally abandoned this idea, the so
called riba is still an important pillar of Islam and in countries where the law
is based on the Sharia’a it is a fundamental element of commercial law.
In the Qur’an we can read that “Those who charge riba are in the same
position as those controlled by the devil’s influence. This is because they
claim that riba is the same as commerce. However, God permits commerce,
and prohibits riba. Thus, whoever heeds this commandment from his Lord,
and refrains from riba, he may keep his past earnings, and his judgement rests
with God. As for those who persist in riba, they incur Hell, wherein they abide
forever “ (Qur’an 2:275), statement that is considered the foundation of this
prohibition.
We should underline that Riba are interests (or other premiums) that don’t
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correspond to a real increase in value, so capital gains are completely lawful.
2.2 Maisir
em “In both of them there is great harm although there is some advantage as
well in them for men, but their harm is much greater than their advantages
“ (Qur’an 2:219). These are the words used in Qur’an to describe gambling
and related businesses, activities that are strictly prohibited. The rationale
is that gambling involve an high level of risk and the possibility to seriously
harm individuals.
The first implication is that instruments that involve an extraordinary level
of risk are illicit, in this case we are talking mainly about exotic OTC deriva-
tives.
But the main implication is that the traditional insurance business model
is illicit, too: it can be considered as a form of gambling (actually the in-
surance company is a player that developed a mathematical system to win)
that, besides, involves an high level of uncertainty (see below).
2.3 Gharar
The meaning of “Gharar” is literally “uncertainty”. Every product contain-
ing gharar is actually considered illicit. The rationale is that in a contract
characterized by gharar (as a derivative), one side can exploit its superior
knowledge (informative asymmetry) to speculate and so creating the possi-
bility of an unfair damage to the counterpart.
It is important to understand how this principle has evolved during the
last decades: in fact, if strictly applied, it will forbid an array of con-
tracts/product now widely diffused in the business world. Hence, jurists
developed the idea of “excessive gharar”: contracts that involve a limited
quantity of gharar and that are essential for the industrial, agricultural and
commercial development should be allowed, while contracts that involve pure
speculation, “wherein the object of sale does not exist at contract inception“
(El-Gamal, 2006) are totally illegal.
2.4 Haram Businesses
Haram is the word used to indicate illicit goods and services: alcohol, pork,
gambling, pornography and weapons are examples of what is considered
haram. The believer should not be involved with these kinds of goods/businesses:
neither as a consumer, nor as an entrepreneur/investor.
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3 Stock Selection
The sharia’a principles mentioned in the last chapter directly affect the con-
struction of Islamic equity portfolios imposing a series of constrictions and
provisions that heavily affect the manager investment decisions.
The stock selection process is probably the most important step in the con-
struction of an Islamic equity fund.
Some sharia’a principles are easily transferable to the AM business, but oth-
ers require not so immediate conjectures. While the general theories are
pretty much the same, it is the application in the real world that, particu-
larly in the past, has been characterized by an heavily fragmented framework
dominated by subjective consideration.
A step toward the harmonization of the stock selection guidelines has been re-
cently made with the institution of a series of common standards by AAIOFI:
the FAS. The FAS are actually accounting standards, but they also try to fill
the critical loophole that has dominated and is still dominating one the most
discussed part of the stock picking process: the acceptable financial ratios.
3.1 Haram Businesses
The guideline regarding “illicit” businesses is the most simple and immediate
transfer from the holy books to the AM practice. Simply, Islamic equity funds
can not invest in companies operating in haram businesses like alcohol, pork,
gambling, pornography and weapons.
While some scholars/jurists state that companies should not be involved in
haram businesses at all, the mainstream opinion is that a limited involvement
is acceptable (5% of the revenues or profits).
3.2 Other Not Sharia’a Compliant Businesses
Some companies are inadmissible not because they operate in haram busi-
nesses, but because the way they are run involve riba, maisir or gharar. An
example are “traditional” banks that generate the large part of their revenues
from interests (hence riba) and “traditional” insurance companies that base
their activities on maisir and gharar. Obviously Islamic banks and Islamic
insurance companies are completely legitimate investments.
Besides, simply having to do with product characterized by riba, masir or
gharar is not illicit. So a broker involved in options is not violating any
sharia’a principle, in fact it generates its revenues from commissions not
from riba. Instead, a prop house trading options is generating profits from
gharar products, hence violating Islamic guidelines.
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3.3 Financial Ratos
Financial ratios requirement is probably the most controversial, although ex-
tremely important, part of the stock selection process. We are not talking
about the standard ratios used in financial statement analysis, but indica-
tors that has been developed precisely for the Islamic equity industry. To
be sharia’a compliant, companies should not be heavily indebted nor they
should heavily rely on revenues generated by credits. An indebted company
is actually “victim” of riba and it is susceptible to receive pressures from in-
stitutes, like traditional banks and NBFCs, that run illicitly their businesses.
Islamic finance professionals and scholars have produced a wide array of
different way to detect inadmissible companies, however the mostly used
(and the one recognized in FAS 21) method is based on three pillars: the
“debt/average capitalization ratio”, the “AR/average capitalization” ratio
and the “cash+ib securities/average capitalization ratio”.
D/C =
total debt
12months averagemarket capitalization
The D/C ratio measures how much a company is indebted compared to
its market value (and not book values as in a standard D/E ratio). It is usu-
ally more correct to consider only interest-bearing debt as numerator, but
it is pretty common to use the total debt to make speedier and simpler the
process. An admissible company has a D/C ratio below 33.33%
AR/C =
account receivables
12months averagemarket capitalization
Ca+ S/C =
cash+ interest bearing securities
12months averagemarket capitalization
The AR/C ratio measures how much a company is offering delayed pay-
ments (and credit) to its clients compared to its market dimension, while
the Ca+S/C ratio measures how much a company is investing its liquidity
in illicit products compared to the same value. Both ratios want to detect
companies that heavily rely on products or business strategies that involve
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riba. While these ratios are less problematic than the one described before,
there are companies operating in particular industries (as retail) that can be
dismissed due to their heavy credit and cash positions.
The limit is equally set for both ratios at 33.33%.
These are the three mostly used indicators, but as we said the world is
much more variegated. Someone prefer using the D/A (Debt/Assets) ratio
instead of the D/C ratio commonly used, others prefer to substitute the two
other indicators with the ratio between Non-Operating Income and Operat-
ing Income (Babikir, 2001) or the ratio between interest-income and total
income (both should not be more than 5-10%).
3.4 Other Provisions
Especially in the past, some funds (and some Islamic scholars) have imple-
mented other screening systems.
Here we should recall the liquidity provision (Usmani, 2007): it argues that
a company can be included only if it holds some liquid assets. If a relevant
part of the company assets is in liquid form, it is actually trading money
that cannot be exchanged except at par. So, this provision requires admis-
sible companies to held liquid assets valued no more than the 33.33% (or
sometime more) of the market capitalization.
L/C =
liquid assets
12months averagemarket capitalization
However, it is important to underline that this provision is actually rarely
used and it is not recognized in any FAS.
Other provisions used by Islamic equity funds refer mainly to sector, coun-
try and other weightings. Some GCC and Malaysian funds have limited the
weight of foreign stocks, while others have imposed minimum cash quantities
or restriction to blue-chips or companies listed on major stock exchanges.
3.5 Provisions Implications
The rationale behind stock picking guidelines is clearly religious or, generally
speaking, ethical. However it is possible to infer that, de facto, some of these
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idea are to some extent also used in traditional stock selection process.
The D/C ratio requirement actually eliminates over-indebted companies.
While the indebtedness depends on many factors (tax system, industry, ma-
turity, etc..), without doubts it is a sign of risk: an indebted company is
characterized by a financial status that can turn being dangerous in weak
markets or after different kinds of shocks. Obviously this selection can also
hamper active AMs, i.e. it will be usually difficult to invest in start-ups or
problematic companies considered undervalued.
As we aforementioned, the AR/C and Ca+S/C ratios can generate few
problems with companies operating in particular industries. However these
guidelines also result in selecting companies that are less dependent on macroe-
conomic variables: a company relying on account receivable could be en-
counter serious problems in a deteriorating economy where clients become
more insolvent, on the other side a company investing a part of its assets
in fixed-income securities could be harmed by rising interest rates. In few
words, as we concluded talking about the D/C ratio, these provisions isolates
less risky companies with a lower beta (Kraeussl and Hayat, 2008).
But another important implications of sharia’a requirements is the lim-
ited diversification. The haram, riba and gharar provisions actually make
inadmissible important economical sectors (particularly financial services, in-
surance and a chunk of the defence&aerospace industry) and financial ratios
seriously affects decisions regarding other ones. The diversification problem
has been repeatedly underlined by professionals and researches (Abderrezak,
2008 and Babikir, 2001) and it is still one of the major downsides of Islamic
equity funds. This is also one of the elements that explain the strong focus
on global equities and quantitatively big stock markets (as USA) where you
can more easily diversify.
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4 Funds Management
The stock picking is without any doubt the AM activity most affected by
sharia’a provisions, however also the management of the funds is subject to
a series of constrictions and special operations that make the Islamic equity
fund management strongly different from a traditional one.
4.1 Management
The are two main ways to manage Islamic equity funds: the mudarabah and
the agency (Usmani, 2007). In the first case the subscriber (rabb-ul-maal)
provides capital to the AM (mudarib), forming a particular form of partner-
ship called mudarabah. The AM is a partner and it will receive a share of
the profit accrued to the fund (performance fee): if there is no profit, the
AM will not receive anything.
In the second case the AM acts as an agent of the subscriber. It receives a pre-
defined commission at the subscription and/or at regular deadlines (monthly,
annually, etc..). The forbidden of the gharar implies that the commission
should be not uncertain, hence fees based on the net value of the fund should
not be allowed (the value change every day, so it is impossible to prede-
termine the commission). However many, mainly western, AMS systemically
use this kind of fee structure and, generally, scholars have recently been more
lax on this issue.
4.2 Zakah (Purification)
One important step in the management of an Islamic equity fund is the s.c.
Zakah. The purification is the elimination of the profit attributable to the
companies income generated from interests (riba) and the distribution of
these to charities. If the company generated 4% of its profit from interests,
4% of the dividends should be given away.
The major discussion is regarding capital gains, some scholars argue that
they should be purified, while others disagree (Usmani, 2007). The former
states that the the market price can reflect these illicit profits and, besides,
in open-ended funds it is possible that the subscribers redeem their quotas
before the distribution of dividends (so the price still reflect these not pu-
rified dividends). The latter argues that it is impossible to determine what
part of the price reflect profits generated from interests and, however, this
part is surely infinitesimal in companies that have passed the financial ratios
screenings.
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4.3 Sharia’a Board
One of the most peculiar characteristic of Islamic equity funds management
structure is the existence of a body aimed at monitoring the activities of the
fund and, generally, the (Islamic) ethical conduct of managers: the sharia’a
board.
Although not every fund actually posses a sharia’a board (De Lorenzo, 2007),
it is a distinguished element of any AM that want to offer some form of com-
pliance guarantee.
The sharia’a board is composed of 1 to 4 scholars or, when not possible,
sharia’a advisors specialized in Islamic financial and commercial law: obvi-
ously the dimension and the importance depend on the size and on the fund
strategy (passive funds require minor controls). As a management composed
of famed analysts, fund managers, etc.. is somewhat a guarantee of an high
quality investment service, a sharia’a board composed of internationally rec-
ognized and influential scholars is a guarantee of an high quality supervision.
The main role of the sharia’a board is to supervise the correct application
of Islamic principles during the stock selection process, a role that it is not
only passive, but usually involves the continuous screening of companies and
of the market in collaboration with fund managers and auditors.
Besides, the board also:
• Supervises the portfolio purification and the allocation of illicit profits
to reliable and legitimate charities and NGOs.
• Monitors the management, role similar to the one of the board of direc-
tors in traditional funds. It sets the objectives and orientations, makes
sure fund managers act ethically and responsibly, evaluates the fund
performance and the investment strategies.
• Ensures the fund transparency and the existence of a sufficient amount
of information (fees, performance, purification, sharia’a compliance,
etc..) for customers. It takes also care of the relations with regulatory
and rating agencies.
4.4 Costs Problem and Recent Trends
The main problem faced by Islamic equity funds is without any doubt the
costs, both for the asset manager and the customer.
Although, as we aforementioned, Islamic equity funds bear a series of peculiar
problems, expenses are still one of the most discussed part of this business:
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both from customers and from asset managers. The extra costs, compared
to a traditional fund, come from the cost of maintaining a complex struc-
ture that include additional bodies (primarily the sharia’a board), tortuous
screening processes and the need of quite rare expertises.
Additionally, the (hypothetical) impossibility to apply a net value-based
management fee (that it is extremely important in traditional mutual funds)
resulted, mainly in the past, in fee structures characterized by abnormally
high subscription and/or entrance fees (Babikir, 2001).
An Islamic equity fund, on average, costs 40 bps more than a traditional fund
(Abderrezak, 2008) and, additionally, often requires much higher minimum
investments (Babikir, 2001 and Abdzerrezak, 2008).
The strong growth and a general acceptance of laxer constrictions (par-
ticularly among western players) have surely lowered the average costs, but
no economies of scale can completely erase costs that are essentials.
A particular way to reduce costs has been chosen by some of the most recent
entrants: ETFs. ETFs are already a cheaper way to invest in indexes and
generally in funds with a passive strategy, but clearly their benefits can be
leveraged in Islamic equity funds.
Particularly Deutsche Bank (x-tracker), together with Barclays (iShares, now
owned by Blackrock) one the two most active player in this field, has chosen
to create a series of products called “Sharia ETF” structured around propri-
etary indexes based on major world indexes (S&P 500, FTSE Europe 350,
etc..): this allow the German bank to offer an unique, sharia’a compliant and
cheaper way to access the world of Islamic equity investments.
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5 Islamic Italian Equity Portfolio
Although it had been expanding at a extremely brisk pace, the Islamic eq-
uity funds industry has traditionally focused its interest in a limited array of
countries: USA, Islamic original countries and marginally the European eq-
uity market. In this section, it will be constructed an Islamic equity portfolio
composed of companies listed at Borsa Italiana and, consequently, it will be
conducted a comparative performance analysis with the market (MIBTEL).
5.1 Methodology
The considered portfolio has been hypothetically constructed in August/September
2008, hence using 1H 2008 book values and July 1st 2007 – June 30th 2008
average market capitalization values. This choice answers to the need to
reduce the biases, particularly referring to the market capitalization: con-
sidering 2008 data would have affected the screening due to the extremely
values touched during the sboom, oppositely considering 2007 data would
have involved the use of high capitalization values reached during the peak.
Generally, have been avoided companies listed on Borsa Italiana but with
headquarters located abroad (i.e. Cell Therapeutics).
The Islamic provisions utilized are the standard ones: no haram, no other
non-compliant businesses and the three FAS approved financial ratios. Re-
garding the latter, the limit value is set at 33.33% (or 1/3). However, it
has been set a 5% error to encompass possible interpretation mistakes of the
different balance sheets (hence, the limits are, set at 35%).
It is not applied any form of purification to capital gains, hence following the
second aforementioned theory.
The weight of every component is proportional to its free-floating, with
a cap set at 25% to avoid excessive concentrations. The weights are rebal-
anced every week, while it is hypothesized an yearly Sharia’a compliance
review (so no review it is actually conducted, it would have happened in
August/September 2009).
Regarding the performance analysis, it has been considered the time frame
June 1st 2006 – May 31st 2009: the frame is sufficiently wide to conduct a
reliable analysis and to encompass different market situations.
The chosen benchmark is the MIBTEL: although the FTSE/MIB is usually
used as a representation of the Italian equity market, the high weight of mid
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and small cap made pretty useless a comparison with this index.
Dividends are not considered, in few words the portfolio is not total return.
Obviously are not considered any form of fees or expenses, it is evaluating
the simple gross performance of the portfolio.
D/C =
total debt
12months averagemarket capitalization
AR/C =
account receivables
12months averagemarket capitalization
Ca+ S/C =
cash+ interest bearing securities
12months averagemarket capitalization
AbsoluteReturn(t)1 =
t∑
i=0
ri
V olatility = σ(returns) ∗
√
52
12mRolling V olatility = σ(returns last 12months) ∗
√
52
SharpeRatio =
AbsolutReturn−Risk Free
V olatility
SharpeRatioModified =
AbsolutReturn−Risk Free
V olatility(AbReturn/|AbReturn|)
Risk Free = average 10yrs TBill = 3.22%
Drawdown(t) = max(1[0;t](i) ∗ AbsoluteReturn(i))− rt
Tracking Error (V olatility) = σ(PortfolioReturns−Benchmark Returns)∗
√
52
Beta = ρ(PortfolioReturns,Benchmark Returns)∗
(
V olatility(Portfolio)
V olatility(Benchmark)
)
Alpha (Jensen) = (PortfolioReturn−Risk Free)−Benchmark Return−Risk Free)∗Beta
InformationRatio =
Alpha
Tracking Error
1Considered the data and the methodology utilized, It has been considered the log
returns (additive across time) a more appropriate option
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5.2 Stock Selection
The first filter to apply is the one regarding haram businesses. This mean
excluding all companies operating in the gambling (i.e. Lottomatica), al-
cohol (i.e. Campari), weapons (i.e. Finmeccanica), pork and pornography
industry. A total of 6 companies have been excluded due to this provision.
Excluded are also all the companies running their businesses in a non-
Islamic way: it is talking mainly about financial institutions (as Unicredit,
Intesa-San Paolo, etc..) and insurance companies (as Generali). Due to this
provision, 37 companies have been excluded.
It is important to underline that this provision heavily alter the strength
weights in an Italian equity market dominated by these types of companies.
Then, the three filters are applied to the remaining companies. The
filtering excluded other 216 companies and the result could be seen in the
Table 5.1.
Out of the hundreds of companies that compose the MIBTEL, only few
passed the Islamic filters. As we aforementioned this is connected to the
structure of Italian companies, the debt as main financing source nearly al-
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ways rule out Italian companies when applying financial ratios provisions.
The most evident result (Graph 5.1) is the deeply different industry break-
down, particularly compared to the FTSE/MIB dominated by banks, energy
companies and utilities.
While the main index represents the strength weights existent in the Italian
corporate world, the resulting portfolio seems representing the Italian excel-
lences. Over 65% is composed of companies operating in one of the most
acclaimed sector of the Made in Italy: fashion. An additional 7% is repre-
sented by the companies that manage the airports of two of the main Italian
tourist hubs: Venice (SAVE) and Florence/Tuscany (AdF). In few words,
nearly 3/4 of the portfolio represents Italian “diamonds”: the only excluded
sector seems food&drinks, mainly due to haram provisions.
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5.3 Absolute Performance
The behaviour of the portfolio is without any doubt peculiar, however it
is possible to identify six different moments:
• 2006 In this strong growth period the portfolio nearly followed the
benchmark, the average return is just around 5 bps below the bench-
mark.
• gen-oct 07 In this period the benchmark and the portfolio reached their
respective peaks. The portfolio behaved better than the benchmark
with an average return 21 bps above the MIBTEL.
• nov 07 – may 08 This period has been signed by the beginning of the
crisis and the downside movement of the market. The portfolio average
return is nearly 35 bps below the benchmark.
• jun 08 – feb 09 The peak of the crisis has been characterized by an
average portfolio return nearly 30 bps above the benchmark.
• mar-jun 09 The market started to grow again and the portfolio regis-
tered an average return nearly 120 bps above the MIBTEL.
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It is clearly not easy to interpret this behaviour. However it seems that
the portfolio behave better in “critical” periods (boom or crisis peaks, fast
growth, etc..), while it underperforms the benchmark when the market is
moving in a more “quiet” way.
This can be partially explained by the great weight of the personal goods
sector (DJ STOXX Personal Goods TMI), that during these periods showed
movements similar to the portfolio behaviour (although higher, due to the
fact the European market generally reacted better than the Italian one).
5.4 Absolute and Relative Risk
A first observation regarding the risk of the portfolio can be made ob-
serving the correlations matrix (Table 5.2). Although the limited number of
stocks could create some problems regarding the diversification, the selected
stocks have quite low correlations with other ones. The major problem could
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be found in the pretty high correlations existent among Geox, Tod’s and
Bulgari, three stocks representing around 70% of the portfolio.
A (rough) diversification measurement could be performed through the Fama’s
measure: the slightly negative value (-0.014) suggests that there are no crit-
ical diversification problems.
It is evident that the volatility of the portfolio (Graph 5.4) is systemati-
cally above the benchmark one. Only in the H2 2007 the gap narrow down
and the 12-months rolling volatility decline below the MIBTEL one.
Differently from what we aforementioned regarding Islamic equity funds, the
Italian Islamic equity portfolio is actually MORE risky than an investment
in the market index.
However, looking at the drawdown, the portfolio looks not so more risky: in
fact the maximum drawdown (-109.66%) is below the maximum drawdown
of the benchmark (-116.31%).
As we mentioned in the sub chapter above, although characterized by an
higher volatility, the Islamic portfolio “navigated” better the crisis.
Overall, it seems that the portfolio performance compared to the bench-
mark is somewhat linked to the volatility (Table below): the three periods
characterized by higher returns correspond to minimal or negative absolute
differences in volatility growth, while the two characterized by lower returns
correspond to higher absolute differences in volatility growth. When the risk
of the portfolio is growing at similar or lower pace than the benchmark, the
portfolio performs better, when the risk is rising at a brisker pace, the port-
folio tend to underperform. In few words, the portfolio does not transform
properly the additional risk in additional returns.
The beta (Graph 5.5) clearly shows the existence of a strong relation-
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ship between the portfolio and the market, besides the nearly unitary value
validate the fact that the portfolio does not actually amplify or reduce the
market movements.
However the tracking error shows the existence of a significant variability
in the movements from the benchmark: while the long-term trend follows
the MIBTEL, the actual periodical movements are characterized by a non-
constance.
It is clear that the additional risk of the portfolio is specific risk; in fact
the systematic risk is pretty much the same of the market. This tells that,
although what we obtained using the Fama measurement, there are actually
some diversification problems.
5.5 Risk-Adjusted Performance
While absolute returns and risk measurement are essential in a portfolio anal-
ysis, without any doubt it is the evaluation of the risk-adjusted performance
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that ultimately reveal the overall quality of the product.
Without any doubt, the Sharpe ratio is one of the most powerful measure-
ment of the portfolio performance.
The charts above shows the ratio between the portfolio and MIBTEL
Sharpe ratios (if above one, it means that the portfolio Sharpe ratio is higher);
when adventuring in the discussed (§ Appendix) problem of negative ratios,
it is shown both the modified and the standard ratio.
The result is pretty much specular to what it has been obtained in the anal-
ysis of the absolute performance. However the period of outperforming looks
narrower: during the early 2007 the portfolio ratio was below the MIBTEL,
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the same during part (Nov 08 – Mar 09) of the crisis.
The scenario is a bit different if considering the “standard” Sharpe ratio, in
this case the portfolio shows a way higher performance during the peak and
the (supposed) recover of the crisis (since mid-July 08 the portfolio Sharpe
ratio has been constantly above the benchmark one) and not a so lower one
during the crisis beginning (1H 2008).
Another interesting point of view to considered is the Alpha and, so the
information ratio. While the Sharpe ratio is useful to compare the portfolio
with the market benchmark after adjusting with the respective risks, the Al-
pha (in this case it has been used the Jensen Alpha) reveals if the portfolio
has actually beat the market.
The result is in this case promising: the 12.11% Alpha clearly and definitely
reveals that in the considered period the portfolio performed better than the
MIBTEL.
Although more useful to compare different portfolios, also the information ra-
tio could be useful. The calculation tells that for every unit of additional risk
(measure by the tracking error), the portfolio provide 0.53 units of additional
profit: without doubts a quite good results.
5.6 Remarks
Without doubts the results obtained analysing the Islamic Italian Equity
portfolio looks quite unexpected.
Although there have been the problems connected with the sharia’a com-
pliance of debt-focused companies, other characteristics typical of Islamic
equity funds seems missing. The most evident is the riskiness: while this
type of funds usually shows a low risk, the considered portfolio is actually
riskier than the market. This characteristic is, however, paired with a (ab-
solute and adjusted) higher performance.
The former could be explained by the important weight in the portfolio
of mid/small-caps marked by high volatilities: CHL, Acotel, Aeroporto di
Firenze and SAVE all show values higher than 60%. The latter could be ex-
plained by the financial ratios that isolated companies with very good book
values and, generally, representing Italian sector and single excellences.
Without any doubts the absence of financial stocks is partially responsible
for the better performance, but the total absence of energy companies clearly
differentiate this portfolio from other Islamic funds it has been observed.
All these characteristics lead to an extremely significant conclusion: the Is-
lamic Italian equity portfolio is a totally different product from other Islamic
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equity ones. The other (US, Global, etc..) products are a safer investment
than investing in the market, this mainly because the ratios isolate finan-
cially solid and with low volatility companies (usually blue-chips).
The Italian one caters to a different category of investor, investors that ac-
cept a higher risk to invest in “gems”: in few words, the Islamic portfolio
offers an extremely competitive trade-off between alpha and risk.
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6 Conclusions
Looking at the results obtained in this paper, it is possible to identify three
main points.
The first main point is that, although the industry has been severely hit
by the crisis, it has still a big growth potential. This is thanks to two im-
portant variables: the strong presence in countries with minimally developed
financial systems and the economical implications of the Islamic provisions.
The focus on countries as India, Malaysia, Indonesia or Turkey allows the
Islamic equity funds industry to penetrate markets with limited competition.
In these countries there is a growing middle-class, while the offering of in-
vestment products is still limited; clearly Islamic funds have the possibility
to gain a considerable share of the market, thing that it is impossible where
traditional funds are widely available. Another important characteristic is
that the religious provisions imply some economically rational guidelines: all
the financial ratios are measurements very similar to the ones used by tra-
ditional stock pickers. Obviously, this is something very rare among ethical
funds: except some green funds investing in high-risk/high-reward high-techs
companies, the majority has stock picking guidelines without any particular
economical rationale.
These considerations should also be useful for ethical investments operators
in the Western world, in fact many of the Islamic provisions are (or bet-
ter were) present in the Christian doctrine (usury, gambling, pornography,
etc..). The idea of a Christian Equity Fund is quite non-sense, but this point
deserve a major analysis: there are many emerging markets (i.e. Brazil and
Mexico) or areas (i.e. some parts of the USA) where Christian values and
morale are still strongly rooted in the community and where there could be
market opportunities for properly repackaged Islamic equity funds.
The second point traces back to the discussion about the risk and perfor-
mance characteristics of Islamic equity funds. The brief analysis conducted
(§ Appendix) generally agrees with the most recent studies (particularly the
one of Kraeussl and Hayat): Islamic equity funds offer a safer investment
opportunity and that is able to better face market shocks.
Besides, the most recent products show an alleviation of the traditional prob-
lems connected to this type of funds: price and diversification.
These characteristics definitely isolate the Islamic equity funds as a particu-
lar and independent category of funds investment: a perfect instrument for
medium to long-term investors looking for a not particularly risky equity
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investment.
This is without doubt another point behind the industry success and future
potentialities: the risk/return structure is particularly suitable to middle-
class/mass aﬄuent clients and generally conservative institutional or quasi-
institutional clients (as pension funds or endowments), the formers have been
the main fuel of the mid 2000s boom and the latter will probably be the key-
market in the future.
Remaining in this area, an additional interesting result is the one regarding
ETFs. Although they are able to offer Islamic equity products at a fraction
of the price requested by mutual funds, they could be collocated in a totally
different area. In fact Islamic ETFs are characterized by an higher risk than
Islamic mutual funds, characteristic that is not present in the comparison
between traditional ETFs and mutual funds. Islamic ETFs are actually a
better choice only for short-term investors that are willing to accept the way
higher risk. It is evident that there is little risk that the ETFs will cannibalize
Islamic mutual funds, they should be a complimentary product mainly suit-
able to clients with large and diversified portfolios (as HNWIs and UHNWIs).
Last but not least are the considerations regarding the Italian equity mar-
ket and Italian financial institutions.
Connections between Italy and the Muslim worlds date back to the IX cen-
tury, when part of the southern part of the peninsula was ruled by Arabs.
Recently Muslims have started to invest capitals in Italy (e.g. Unicredit),
particularly Libic investors. Besides, Italian financial institutions are ex-
panding in the Muslim world: Intesa SanPaolo is directly present in Albania,
Bosnia, Egypt and UAE, Unicredit in Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Kirghizistan and
Turkey.
However both internal and external operations are still minimal compared
to the existent potential: partially due to law restrictions, partially due to a,
mainly social and political, mistrust climate grown in the last 10-15 years.
A major constraint to the born of this industry is without doubts also the
law: Italian civil, commercial and banking law still clashes with some Islamic
principles making some operations impossible or very difficult. However, this
particular framework clearly offers interesting internal and external oppor-
tunities for Italian financial institutions.
And the peculiar results of the conducted analysis clearly indicates a path
to follow.
Problems regarding the compliance of Italian companies were obviously ex-
pected: in Italy the fiscal system greatly favours the financing through debt.
This is partially responsible for the very small number of companies that
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actually passed the Islamic filters.
The most evident surprise is the digression from what could be considered
the norm among Islamic equity funds: the portfolio is riskier than the mar-
ket.
This clearly place the portfolio in a unique position among peers, a product
able to offer an interesting risk/return combination not very common among
other Islamic equity funds.
As it has been aforementioned, this is probably strongly linked to the un-
common composition of the portfolio, a portfolio dominated by the retail and
personal goods sector. The portfolio, in few words, offers the opportunity
to invest in some of the most acclaimed sector of the Made in Italy, while
following the Islamic provisions.
The main targets of operations in Islamic countries should clearly be the
middle-class/mass-aﬄuent segment, which could be easily reached through
the existent network of branches that some Italian banks have in these coun-
tries. Some of these countries, as Turkey and Egypt, have nearly undeveloped
Islamic finance industries and minor Islamic equity funds offerings, but a big
or even huge potential client base. Italian banks and AMs could leverage
their presence and the political/economical superior relations to enter and
develop this lucrative market.
Different is the strategy regarding operations in the Italian equity market: the
underlined uniqueness of the portfolio clearly offers an interesting and com-
petitive opportunity to Italian players. Italian financial institutions would
be able to offer products based on Italian equities that could be used in large
portfolios as the ones of HNWIs, pension funds or even funds of funds. The
different characteristics compared to other Islamic equity products, clearly
offer these (quasi) institutional investors the opportunity to develop more
diversified portfolios mainly in terms of risk and sector breakdown.
This strategy can be implemented through the existent subsidiaries that Ital-
ian companies have in Islamic countries, through in-house structures built in
Italy or through partnerships/join ventures with local players that lack the
scale and/or the technical skills to deal with big institutional investors.
On the other hand, there are obviously the opportunities in the internal Ital-
ian market. What is evident is that although there are great potentials, the
hypothetical client base is still “raw” (small middle-class, financially illiter-
ate, etc..) and the Italian equity market offers solutions not very suitable to
a mainly conservative and risk adverse investor class. So, the Italian market
would be more suitable to financial institutions with a established presence
in the industry or to Italian ones when they will have acquired sufficient ex-
perience.
However, the implementation of basic banking services would be able to at-
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tract an often young customer base and raise the interest and knowledge
among second/third generation Muslims in Islamic finance products: this
could be clearly the base for a future (10-15 years) introduction of the Ital-
ian focused products.
Without any doubt the Islamic equity funds industry has still great growth
potentials and, obviously, they lie mainly in developing Islamic countries.
Without any doubt the industry has seen the entrance of financial giants as
UBS, DB, Allianz or the American IBs that clearly want to get their juicy
big slice of the cake. Without any doubts it is still a business that requires
higher expenses, investments and a lot of political pressure.
But all this should not be an obstacle to Italy, Italian companies and Italian
financial institutions to benefit from this opportunity.
The Italian players already have an extensive experience in emerging mar-
kets (as in the CEE) and the ties with the Islamic world have always been
stronger than other countries (this is the reason why France banks are suc-
ceeding more than American heavy-weights).
It only requires the willingness to invest money in this sector, it only requires
the political and cultural willingness to the diffidence and animosity rose in
the last decade: then, there will be no limit.
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A Funds Comparison
One of the most discussed characteristic of Islamic equity funds is their per-
formance compared to traditional products. The matter is actually quite
recent, due to the short history of this industry (Kraeussl and Hayat, 2008),
and the results have been quite different.
Studies that have used 1997-2001 data (Abderrezak, 2008) reached nega-
tive conclusions regarding Islamic equity funds: inferior relative and abso-
lute performances and limited diversification. Other studies (Kraeussl and
Hayat, 2008) that have used more recent data (2001-2006) reached different
conclusions: although Islamic equity funds have several (and critical) prob-
lems, they offer a safe haven during bear markets (particularly thanks to a
systematically lower Beta).
A.1 Methodology
In this section a systematic analysis will not be conducted: this is not the ob-
jective. The data are not widely available and the youth of the phenomenon
make a complete analysis heavily biased (funds choice, data available, etc..).
Indeed, we are particularly interested in observing the behaviour during the
financial crisis.
The decision to choose Global Equity funds and ETFs has the goal to con-
sider highly liquid funds and that generally not represents a particular ge-
ographical area. Obviously if it had been considered funds with a specific
geographic focus, the result could have been different. The choice of the two
Islamic products has been guided by the dimension and the importance of
the financial institution: the UBS product is a big and extremely popular
fund with a long history of analysis (practically it appears in every research,
study, etc...), the Allianz fund is way smaller but represents one of the latest
products offered before the crisis by a major AM player.
The ETF choices are inevitably the iShares products (without doubts one of
the biggest player in this field).
The choices regarding the pool of traditional funds follow a pattern similar
to the Islamic one: we focused on big funds with a long enough history and
offered by major players. However, we have also focused on obtaining a pool
of both European and American asset managers and funds with different
investment strategies (some passive and some active).
The data used are from 17/06/2008 to 17/06/2009 and has been obtained
from the corporate websites and/or financial data providers (mainly Reuters).
The data regarding the composition of funds has been obtained from the lat-
est available prospectuses.
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AbsoluteReturn(t) =
t∑
i=0
ri
V olatility = σ(returns) ∗
√
252
SharpeRatio =
AbsolutReturn−Risk Free
V olatility
SharpeRatioModified =
AbsolutReturn−Risk Free
V olatility(AbReturn/|AbReturn|)
Risk Free = average 10yrs TBill = 3.22%
Max/Min = Maximum/Minimumabsolute return during holding period
Beta = ρ(PortfolioReturns,Benchmark Returns)∗
(
V olatility(Portfolio)
V olatility(Benchmark)
)
Benchmark = MSCI World
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A.2 Global Equity Mutual Funds
ALLIANZ RCM GLOBAL EQUITY OPPORTUNITIES A USD
ISIN: LU0356362771
Launch Date: 22/07/2008
Net Assets: 43 mln USD (30/04/2009)
Front End Load: 5.00%
Management Fee (p.a.): 1.50% (max 2.50%)
Abs Return: -27.00%
Max/Min: +0.39% / -40.74%
Volatility: 29.34%
Sharpe Ratio: -0.86
Sharpe Ratio (mod): -0.11
Beta: 0.23
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UBS ISLAMIC FUND - GLOBAL EQUITIES
ISIN: LU0108058487
Launch Date: 19/05/2000
Net Assets: 337 mln USD (30/05/2009)
Front End Load: 6.00%
Management Fee (p.a.): 2.04%
Abs Return: -25.48%
Max/Min: -0.76% / -41.64%
Volatility: 35.28%
Sharpe Ratio: -0.68
Sharpe Ratio (mod): -0.12
Beta: 0.93
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POOL
Funds: Templeton Equity Income
Alliance Bernstein Global Equity Blend
GS Global Equity Portfolio
JPMG Global Equity
Schroder Global Equity Alpha
Average Front End Load: 5.05%
Average Management Fee (p.a.): 1.50%
Average Abs Return: -35.01% (min -44.29% / max -27.00%)
Average Volatility: 43.29% (min 39.79% / max 49.31%)
Average Sharpe Ratio: -0.74 (min -0.85 / max -0.63)
Average Sharpe Ratio (mod): -0.20 (min -0.28 / max -0.15)
Average Beta: 0.88 (min 0.50 / max 1.23)
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A.2.1 Remarks
The most evident characteristic of analysed Islamic equity funds is the
performance. Although negative, both funds reported higher returns than
all considered traditional funds: actually, only the Schroder fund reported
a return comparable to Islamic funds. Particularly, the difference could be
found in the better response of Islamic funds during the peak of the crisis:
while the traditional funds followed the market (MSCI World) in the sub-60
area, Islamic funds barely broke this threshold.
This can be partially explained by the absence in Islamic portfolios of the
seriously hit financial sector (that weights around 18% in traditional portfo-
lios and it is compensated by an higher weight of technological sectors) and
generally a lower Beta.
A similar discussion could be held regarding volatility; again Islamic funds
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resulted to be a safer investment with values well below the traditional prod-
ucts average.
Consequently, the sum of these two variables resulted in Islamic equity funds
outperforming (relatively speaking) the market and other funds: in fact the
Sharpe ratio (or better, the modified version adapted to negative returns) is
sensibly higher than other funds considered.
Another interesting point is the diversification problem. The Islamic
funds don’t show particular sectors diversification limitations, although the
average number of different companies present in their portfolios is lower than
in a traditional fund. The major downside seems the countries concentration:
both Islamic funds are strongly focused on a bunch of countries, particularly
Anglo-Saxon ones (USA, UK, Canada and Australia make more than 70% of
the portfolios, while in traditional ones the percentage is only around 50%).
This is mainly due to the different corporate establishment existent in dif-
ferent countries: Continental European countries as Germany or France are
dominated by financial institutions and other industries usually not favoured
by Islamic provisions (e.g. heavy industries) so they are more easily filtered
by Islamic financial ratios provisions, while in Anglo-Saxon countries there
are strong companies operating in favourable sectors (e.g. Energy, Telecom
and Personal Goods). Using the Fama’s diversification measure, it is possible
to observe that the Allianz fund shows no particular problem (the value is
nearly 0), while the UBS fund actually shows some problems (the value is
around 0.03). It seems that the characteristic diversification problem of older
funds has disappeared in newer ones.
Last but not least, it is important to analyse the differences in terms of ex-
penses. The “historical” fund (UBS) shows some of the Islamic equity funds
common problems: a higher front-load (95 bps) and higher management fees
(50 bps). This problem does not affect the more recent Allianz fund, both
the front-load and management fees are comparable to traditional funds.
However, it is important to underline that the better performances, in the
considered framework, more than compensate any major cost.
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A.3 Global Equity ETFs
ISHARES MSCI WORLD ISLAMIC
ISIN: IE00B27YCN58
Launch Date: 07/12/2007
Net Assets: 11.9 mln USD (31/03/2009)
Front End Load: 0.00%
Management Fee (p.a.): 0.60%
Abs Return: -31.36%
Max/Min: +0.39% / -47.92%
Volatility: 39.56%
Sharpe Ratio: -0.73
Sharpe Ratio (mod): -0.16
Beta: 0.80
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ISHARES MSCI WORLD
ISIN: IE00B0M62Q58
Launch Date: 27/10/2005
Net Assets: 1.6 bln USD (31/03/2009)
Front End Load: 0.00%
Management Fee (p.a.): 0.50%
Abs Return: -33.04%
Max/Min: +0.33% / -52.19%
Volatility: 41.82%
Sharpe Ratio: -0.73
Sharpe Ratio (mod): -0.18
Beta: 0.91
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A.3.1 Remarks
As already observed while speaking about mutual funds, also Islamic ETF
registered in the considered period higher returns than its peers: either abso-
lutely speaking, either relatively speaking. Islamic products, hence, offered
a better performing and less risky investment solution in the world equity
market.
An aspect that requires a particular attention is the comparison between
mutual funds and ETFs, specially a comparison between Islamic funds and
the Islamic ETF.
The most evident fact is that the Islamic ETF is way less performing and
way more risky than the two Islamic mutual funds. The gap narrow down
when considering expenses (are considered only the two types of fees usually
critical for Islamic equity funds), in this case the ETFs (both the traditional
one and the Islamic one) would have offered higher returns. It is important
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to underline that, evaluating relative returns, Islamic mutual funds still offer
a better solution.
Due to the chronic lack of data (there is only a bunch of Islamic equity
ETFs), it is difficult to reach a conclusion. However, it is possible to find the
explanation of the discrepancies between Islamic products in the different
structures: the mutual funds are characterized by a variable level of discre-
tion, while ETFs are strongly linked to the underlying index. The limited
flexibility clearly creates diversification problems.
In few words Islamic ETFs could be a cheaper alternative, but they cannot be
considered a full alternative. While traditional ETFs offer performances sim-
ilar to equal mutual funds at a discounted price, Islamic ETFs seem offering
a products characterized by much lower expenses but without the traditional
pros of Islamic equity products. While they are currently a valid alternative
to old-fashioned products like the UBS one, they are more convenient than
newer products only for short-term investments.
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A.4 Sharpe Ratio in Funds Comparison
One of the most critical point in using the Sharpe ratio is when dealing with
negative ratios. In this case, with equal negative return, a higher volatility
means an higher Sharpe ratio. There are actually three different way to in-
terpret this result:
• Negative Sharpe ratio is nonsense, no one would accept a return lower
than the risk free. So, a negative ratio is NA
• It is better to achieve the same negative return with a higher volatility
because there were also higher profit potential.
• Modify the formula, replacing volatility with 1/volatility
In the fund comparison section, we used the latter interpretation. In fact
it is the only that respect the mean-variance theorem (that is the basis of
Sharpe ratio).
In this appendix, we will make a similar comparison using the non-modified
ratio
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A.4.1 Remarks
It is evident that using this interpretation, the conclusions also are af-
fected.
Without considering expenses, the UBS fund (although not the best option
any more) still retain a top position. Instead, the Allianz fund switches from
the 2nd to the last position: the return is excessively negative compared to
the low risk involved.
Considering also expenses, the UBS fund report results nearly aligned with
other traditional funds while, obviously, the Allianz fund falls in the last
position. In this framework the two ETFs (Islamic and not) dominate with
ratios higher than similar mutual funds.
This different approach reveal a different side of the Islamic equity fund
industry: although generally much less risky, the absolute returns are not
equally much higher. A reliable consideration should consider the type of
investor:
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• a short-term investor without risk constraints would find in ETFs his
ideal product
• a long-term investor without risk constraints should opt for a good
mutual fund or an “old-style” (more market dependent) Islamic fund
• a risk adverse investor should opt for Islamic funds, better the newer
ones (low Beta)
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